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ABSTRACT
During situations of armed conflict, United Nations (UN) agencies have been
consistently faced with challenges to access vulnerable populations in order to fulfill
their humanitarian mandates. This is particularly true in countries such as Yemen,
Libya, and Ukraine who have faced prolonged conflict situations from as early as
2010. During these conflicts, UN agencies have been frequently unable to enter areas
that are controlled by non-state armed groups. There are several legitimate reasons for
these access challenges, one of which includes the inadequate legal framework that
governs non-state armed groups. This is not to neglect the operational and executive
ineffectiveness of the UN or the political dynamics that shape these conflicts. In fact,
this paper argues that these aspects complement the insufficiencies that are witnessed
within the international legal system. The ineffectiveness of the UN, which is
ultimately driven by the political interests of states, have not only been part and parcel
to the genesis and influx of non-state armed groups in the respective countries, but
have also played a major role in maintaining the legal positioning of non-state armed
groups as a byproduct of the international system rather than main actors. The paper
maintains that non-state armed groups have become significant players in
international relations due to their increase in regional power and ability to affect
politics. With this reality, the current legal framework that governs non-state armed
groups has been proven to be an insufficient mechanism of enabling the interaction
between UN agencies and non-state armed groups. In an attempt to ease such an
interaction, the paper proposes some legal reforms, which are based on findings that
prove the inconsistencies of that legal framework. It also offers policy suggestions for
operational reforms within the UN system to facilitate the efficient implementation of
the legal reforms.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations was founded on a mandate of maintaining international peace and
security. Within that mandate, there exists a diversity of activities that the United
Nations (UN) undertakes ranging from facilitating peacemaking processes between
states and combatting poverty. In that light, some UN agencies build their emergency
operations on a humanitarian mandate, which is based on supporting populations in
need through the distribution of aid. Other agencies have the intent of raising
awareness about global issues while some are based on creating dialogue between
states and other entities. Those that have the mandate to distribute humanitarian aid to
populations in need, specifically in conflict situations, are now facing increased
challenges in fulfilling that purpose.
The dynamics of global conflicts in the recent decade have proven to be more
complex than conventional warfare. The current refugee crisis, the use of
unconventional weaponry, and the increased presence of non-state actors in regions
such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe have all contributed to the complexity of
armed conflicts, specifically due to the influx of transnational armed groups. 1 These
factors have posed significant obstacles for UN agencies and have brought about
challenges to the scope within which they operate.
One of the obstacles that UN agencies face due to the current state of conflicts
is the high level of security risks for staff deployed in conflict areas. Recent efforts
have been made by UN agencies to increase security precautions for staff members on
1

See Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J TRANS LAW 1, (2004). Berman argues that
although the identity of actors may change over time, historically, the issue of nonstate actors has always shaped the laws of war. Their identities and labels may change
over time, from the native to the rebel to the unlawful combatant and the nature of
wars may change too, from the frontier wars to the war on terror, but the structure of
legal argument was always responsive to the issue of non-state actors. However, what
is now becoming a norm is the ‘transnational’ nature of armed conflict in light of the
growing power and resources of non-state armed groups. Therefore, although Berman
discusses the adaptive nature of international law to the malleable nature of non-state
actors and war, the transnational nature of armed groups has now become a
component of adaptation that international law is yet to adapt to. See generally Marco
Sassòli, Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law, 6 HPCR
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, 25 – 28, (2006). The idea of ‘transnational’ armed
conflicts will be further discussed in the legal analysis of this paper.

mission, although the risks are still undeniable. Another challenge that UN agencies
face is the terms and conditions imposed by donors when a sum is given to a UN
agency to fulfill a humanitarian goal. 2 Conflicts of interest arise when donors restrict
the use of funds to a particular region and may limit the agency’s interaction with
particular groups or states. 3 UN agencies have been attempting to work around some
of these challenges, albeit with some difficulty, by negotiating certain terms in order
to expand their ability to interact with certain groups and enter certain regions to
distribute aid to their populations. There are also situations where UN agencies have
preferred taking loans from other countries or organizations that are less restrictive so
as to attend to the needs for populations more freely. 4
However, the primary challenge that this paper discusses is the access
challenges that UN agencies face in particular areas within a state or region, whether
they are controlled by the government or by non-state armed groups. 5 Access to nongovernment controlled areas (NGCAs) 6 has proven to be the more pressing challenge
for UN agencies, particularly when the UN agency is required to request access from
a non-state armed group, which involves an elongated process of negotiations. Such a
process poses further challenges on UN agencies.
In order to successfully examine these access challenges, it is important to
introduce the context under which UN agencies face access issues. Since the eruption
of the Arab Spring in 2011, UN agencies have been attempting to attend to the needs
of affected populations. This is especially significant with the influx or emergence of
2

Examples of humanitarian goals include, but are not limited to, distributing food,
providing health care services, and providing protection for migrants and refugees.
3
Claudia McGoldrick, The Future of Humanitarian Action: An ICRC Perspective, 93
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 965, 974 – 975, (2011).
4
Information on the funding practices of the United Nations can be found here,
ROMESH MUTTUKUMARU, THE FUNDING AND RELATED PRACTICES OF THE UN
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM, (May 2015), available at
http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/qcpr/pdf/ie_muttukumaru_paper_funding.pdf.
5
The term “non-state actors” refers to all actors within a state that are not affiliated
with any state entity. This includes, but is not limited to, non-governmental
organizations, civil society, corporations, and non-state armed groups. For the
purposes of this research, the term will be limited to non-state armed groups in order
to illustrate the challenges that are faced by UN agencies due to the presence of nonstate armed groups in conflict areas and their control over certain regions.
6
Non-government controlled areas (NGCAs) is in reference to areas or regions within
a state that are controlled by non-state armed groups such as rebel groups or
opposition forces. This is in contrast with government controlled areas (GCAs).
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non-state armed groups caused by civil unrest in the region. The contexts of Yemen,
Libya, and Ukraine will be outlined in order to illustrate the severity of the access
constraints faced by UN agencies as a result of non-state armed groups’ control over
certain areas of land. Limiting the countries focused on to Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine
is because UN agencies, and their local nongovernmental partners, have become the
primary humanitarian actors in these countries as a result of the severity of their
conflicts. 7 This paper does not aim to provide a complete account of the obstacles
faced by UN agencies, but rather it aims to exemplify the access challenges that the
current legal framework poses on such agencies in these areas. Adding Ukraine to the
cases discussed benefits the research in providing an account of a non-Arab country
that faced a similar uprising but is outside the region. Thus, the purpose of providing
this example is to show that the impediments faced by UN agencies are not restricted
to the Middle East.
UN agencies’ access challenges can be attributed to a plethora of factors. The
primary factor that this paper intends to discuss is the insufficiencies imbedded within
the legal framework governing non-state armed groups under which the UN operates.
This is the common factor that is observed when examining the context under which
access challenges are faced. It can be argued that the said obstacles are a result of the
gaps in the current legal framework that governs non-state armed groups under the
law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian law (IHL). 8 The lack of a
comprehensive legal mechanism that governs the conduct between non-state armed
groups and humanitarian agencies has impeded the UN’s ability to access certain
regions, specifically those controlled by non-state armed groups, or NGCAs.
Other explanations for the reasons behind UN agencies’ access challenges
exist and indeed complement the main argument of the ineffectiveness of the legal
framework governing non-state armed groups. These arguments include that the
nature of modern conflicts and political dynamics in the international world has
caused challenges for the UN that cannot be surpassed through their humanitarian

7

This is also true for cases such as Syria and Iraq; however, both cases have been
omitted from the study because of the political complexities of both conflicts as well
as the inability to use inconsistent data collected in NGCAs.
8
The area of law that governs the conduct of parties to the conflict during warfare is
known as international humanitarian law (IHL).
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mandate. 9 Other arguments go further than this by not only attributing these
challenges to the fluctuation of political dynamics, but also emphasize that these
political dynamics ensure that non-state armed groups remain within their current
status as subsidiaries within the international legal system, rather than being
considered main actors. 10 Given that the UN operates within this political dynamic, it
can be argued that the UN has been unable to alleviate these challenges. This UN
ineffectiveness can be attributed to both executive and organizational drawbacks,
where the executive drawbacks are a result of the policy restrictions caused by the
political interests of states. Organizational constraints include their lack of
organizational effectiveness, where it is believed that with its current structure and
capabilities, the UN has been unable to fulfill its declared goals simply because it
does not have the capacity to do so. 11 The convergence of these constraints seems to
be the most plausible illustration of reality, where the political dynamics of the
international system in which the UN operates, leading them to become ineffective,
can be considered reasons behind access challenges. 12
This does not derogate from the argument that the current legal system is
lacking in effectiveness in governing non-state armed groups. On the contrary, it can
be argued that the inefficiencies of the current legal framework governing non-state
armed groups is one of the outcomes of the UN’s ineffectiveness within the political
dynamics of the international system. More specifically, the continuous interests of
states to maintain the current legal and political positioning of non-state armed groups
contributes to the insufficiencies of the legal framework that currently governs nonstate armed groups. Within that framework of state interests, the UN is unable to
integrate non-state armed groups within the legal system.
Because the current legal framework governing non-state armed groups is
insufficient in fulfilling of the UN’s humanitarian mandate in conflict situations, it is
important to assess the laws that govern the said groups, as they highly contribute to
the UN’s ability to gain access to all areas with affected populations. Most notably,
9

McGoldrick, supra note 3, at 967 – 972.
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed
Conflicts, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, (2011), at 48 – 52.
11
See e.g. THORSTEN BENNER, STEPHAN MERGENTHALER & PHILIPP ROTMANN, THE
NEW WORLD OF UN PEACE OPERATIONS: LEARNING TO BUILD PEACE? 12 – 50 (OUP
Oxford, 2011).
12
International Humanitarian Law, supra note 10, at 23 – 26.
10
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the Geneva Conventions of 1949, their Additional Protocols, and customary
international law have built a mechanism of governance of armed conflicts that is
state-centric. This centricity has ultimately resulted in a framework that treats nonstate armed groups simply as an illegitimate entity within the legal system. However,
it has become apparent that non-state armed groups’ increasing significance in
international relations has created a legal importance for them, as they shape the
dynamic of relations between other actors within the international system. Therefore,
it is imperative that the legal framework governing non-state armed groups,
specifically their relationship with humanitarian organizations, be revisited.
Propositions will be made to further integrate these actors within the legal system so
as to ensure that UN agencies are able to interact with them in a manner that holds
both parties accountable as well as ensures that affected populations are receiving
necessary aid. Simultaneously, policy reforms will be suggested to complement this
legal reform to ensure the maximum effectiveness of the institutions that will
implement them.
Within this paper, Part I introduces the narrative of access difficulties for UN
agencies and attributes the cause to the legal framework governing non-state armed
groups under IHL, whilst Part II provides an account of the humanitarian situation in
the three mentioned states of Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine in order to contextualize the
access challenges faced as a result of the current legal framework. Part III emphasizes
the importance of recognizing non-state armed groups as a legitimate force in the
international system, ensuring that although armed groups are not legally equivalent
to a state, they remain significant actors in the international system. Part IV details
and critiques the applicable laws within the context of non-state armed groups and
access challenges, where the applicable laws are limited to international humanitarian
law and customary international law. Part V briefly discusses the role of the United
Nations at the executive and operational levels in causing access constraints for its
agencies that can be attributed to the political dynamics within which the UN
operates, which in turn affects the legal framework of international law and its
application in governing non-state armed groups. In that light, Part VI finally argues
for necessary changes in the law in order to accommodate the growing needs of
populations in distress as a result of conflict through further integrating non-state
armed groups within the international legal system. In addition, considering the role

5

of the UN in the international system, this part also acknowledges the need for
operational and policy reform on the part of states and the UN.

6

II.

THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

The current humanitarian situation of the aforementioned countries of Yemen, Libya,
and Ukraine has been one of grave concern to the international community. The
situations assessed are currently among the most violent conflicts witnessed since the
eruption of their respective uprisings beginning as early as 2010. Following the
uprisings in all three crises, UN agencies such as the World Food Program (WFP),
United Nations Children’s Relief Fund (UNICEF), UN Women, United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), among other humanitarian organizations, resorted to their emergency
mandates and began strategizing to enter these regions in order to provide aid to the
distraught populations.
Within this context, the role of other actors, aside from the legal framework
governing non-state armed groups, is significant. The ineffectiveness of the UN at an
executive and operational level has played a major role in prolonging the crises
discussed. 13 In addition, the involvement of third party states, specifically the West,
whether directly or indirectly, in these crises have not only caused further
complications in attempting to resolve the conflicts, but they have also played a major
role in the actual creation of non-state armed groups in the regions as well as provided
them with weaponry and financial support on several occasions, leading to the
violence witnessed. 14 Yet despite their involvement, they remain adamant on ensuring
that non-state armed groups are maintained in their sidelined position under
international law. Bearing this in mind, the three crises that will be discussed share
resembling patterns in the genesis of non-state armed groups, whereby third parties
are involved in the support, if not creation, of such groups but are unwilling to bear
the legal or political responsibilities of such an outcome. 15
13

See UN’s Pillay Slams Security Council ‘Failure’, AL JAZEERA, August 22, 2014;
THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
2014/15, (Feb. 2015).
14
See e.g., Ryan Timothy Jacobs, A History of Conflict and International Intervention
in Libya, 6 GLOBAL SECURITY STUDIES, 5 (2015).
15
Garikai Chengu, America Created Al-Qaeda and the ISIS Terror Group, GLOBAL
RESEARCH: CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON GLOBALIZATION, (Feb. 2016), available at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/america-created-al-qaeda-and-the-isis-terrorgroup/5402881.
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In discussing the contexts of Yemen and Libya, it is important to understand that a
large portion of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region was governed by
absolutist regimes. This is important because the regional contexts feed directly into
the two MENA cases of discussion. The eruption of uprisings throughout the region
has led to an emergence of non-state armed groups performing cross-border
operations that highly affect both Yemen and Libya. Since 2010, portions of Arab
populations built dissenting responses against the despotic regimes whether for
political, social, economic, or religious reasons. The Arab region as a whole
witnessed a sequence of eruptions led by groups that formed during the reign of the
respective dictators. To provide a brief background, the conflicts began with the
Tunisian revolution in December 2010. Following this was the Egyptian Revolution
in January 2011 alongside the Yemeni revolution, which paved the way for a Libyan
revolution, which took place in February 2011 and is now known as the Libyan Civil
War. Shortly after, protests erupted in Syria leading to the current civil conflict that
began with religious segregation and oppression of the majority Sunni Muslims by the
Alawite regime. 16 Because the Tunisian and Egyptian cases are now relatively stable
in terms of civil conflict, they will not be assessed as part of this study. Furthermore,
because of the complexity of the Syrian case, due to the religious, cultural, and
ultimately political nature of the conflict, it will also be omitted. Limiting the cases to
Yemen and Libya serves this paper because of their prolonged civil conflicts that
involve non-state armed groups as primary actors within the conflicts.
On the Eastern European front, the Ukrainian crisis also faces similar conditions
as that of the Yemeni and Libyan conflicts. The Ukrainian strife erupted in November
2013 where a civil conflict occurred highly based on political and ethnic beliefs,
effectively segregating Ukraine into a Western front, which is government controlled,
and an Eastern front, nongovernment controlled. 17 The Ukrainian conflict is added to

16

The facts presented regarding the Middle Eastern conflicts can be found at UNITED
NATIONS PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS, (2011), available at
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2011.pdf (last visited Nov 4,
2015).
17
The facts presented regarding the Ukrainian conflict can be found at Humanitarian
Response, OFFICE FOR COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION [hereinafter
‘OCHA’], available at https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine
(last visited Nov 5, 2015).
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the case studies to ensure that the arguments presented regarding UN agencies’ access
challenges in emergency situations are not ethnocentric or specific to the MENA
region, but rather are a global concern. Furthermore, the actions of non-state armed
groups in Eastern Ukraine somewhat differ in nature than that of the Yemeni and
Libyan situations in such that they are more limited to their region and rarely perform
cross-border operations. This example serves as an asset to the study, as it illustrates
the difficulties in the UN’s interaction with non-state armed groups regardless of the
location of their operations.
In order to understand the access challenges that UN agencies face when dealing
with non-state armed groups, it is important to provide an account of the humanitarian
situation of each of the three conflicts as well as outline the activities that UN
agencies undertake as a method of fulfilling their humanitarian mandate and
providing aid to affected populations.
A. Yemen
In 2011, Yemeni opposition groups were forming to combat the tyranny of its
despotic government. Some of these groups became militia groups who were equally
responsible for the bloodshed witnessed throughout the years. By November 2011,
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh transferred his power to Vice President
Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi who later became President through elections that took place
in February 2012. However, this was faced with great dissent from a large ethnic
group that descends from a Muslim sect of Shias called the Houthis, who were largely
in support of the former President. This group became recognized as a non-state
armed group, or a rebel group, which currently opposes the Yemeni government and
performs large-scale armed attacks against government forces. The Hadi government
has also gained considerable support by what are known as the anti-Houthi forces. In
the process, Yemen’s security forces have also been segregated with each party
pledging their loyalties to the opposing sides. Both the Houthis and anti-Houthi forces
are further faced with hostilities from the non-state armed group of al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) that are mostly situated in the south and south-east of
Yemen.
In 2014, Houthi forces officially took control of the government and
overthrew the Hadi government. In response, anti-Houthi forces have been
combatting the current Houthi government, and in their assistance, a Saudi-led

9

coalition is politically and militarily aiding them with airstrikes. Other factions
consider both the Houthis and their opposition militia groups. The Islamic State (IS),
who is labeled as a terrorist organization, also joined the conflict by opposing both the
anti-Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Each of these actors is situated in a
particular region in Yemen, where Houthi forces, who support the former President
Saleh and are aided by the Islamic State, are mostly situated in the east. The antiHouthi forces, supporting the allegedly legitimate President Hadi and are aided by the
Saudi coalition, are situated in the south. Constant clashes between these groups in
various areas around Yemen lead to assumption that control is quite arbitrary between
each faction.
Nevertheless, a consistent pattern of control is observed, whereby the control
of provinces is split between these coalitions. The Houthi forces are fighting the Saudi
coalition in the Taiz in the southwest and Marib in the western region where each
party is attempting to take control of towns and villages in those areas. The antiHouthi forces and Saudi coalition are focused in Aden, where Hadi rallied supporters
from the segregated national military in order to seize control of the province against
the Houthi forces. By late 2015, the Saudi-led coalition was in fact able to take
control over Aden and is currently based there. Meanwhile, the Houthi forces have
taken control over a large portion of western Yemen including the capital city Sana’a
and other major cities and ports such as Al-Hudaydah, Sa’dah, Amran, and Dhamar. 18
Other areas in the west are considered to have disputed control and consistent armed
conflict such as Taiz, Ibb, Al-Bayda, and Marib. Mukalla in the south and Hadramawt
in the east are largely controlled by AQAP fighting against both the Houthis and the
Saudi coalition, whilst IS carries out arbitrary attacks throughout Yemen, specifically
in the capital. 19
With this in mind, it is clear that large portions of the western and southern
regions of Yemen are facing severe conflict with violence extending from military
facilities to civilian areas. According to the United Nations Office for the
18

Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, Oct. 2015, at 2.
19
Id.; Chronology of Events: Yemen, SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT (2016), available
at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/yemen.php?page=1 (last visited
Apr 24, 2016); Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom? BBC (2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423 (last visited Apr 24, 2016).
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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), only one year after the armed
conflict in Yemen broke out, approximately 21.2 million people were in need of some
form of humanitarian assistance. This comprises approximately 82 percent of the
Yemeni population, which is already the least developed nation in the MENA region.
In terms of food insecurity, 14.4 million people are food insecure, with 7.6 of these
who are severely food insecure. In addition, 19.4 million people lack clean water and
sanitation and 14.1 million are unable to be provided with adequate healthcare. An
approximate 600 of the Yemeni health facilities have been forced to close down due
to damage of infrastructure with a high shortage of critical health supplies. Of these
facilities, about 220 facilities that provide treatment for acute malnutrition were
forced to close. At least 2.7 million of the affected population is internally displaced,
where internally displaced persons (IDPs) have left their homes and migrated to other
provinces in Yemen or to neighboring countries such as Djibouti or Saudi Arabia.
Finally, civilians are at risk of both physical and psychosocial well-being. Over 50 per
cent of the population is in need of protection including 7.4 million children. There
has been an average of 41 reports of human rights violations being verified every day
since January 2016. Since mid-March 2015, more than 1.8 million children dropped
out of school as a result of the conflict causing the total school dropout rate to reach
more than 3.4 million students. By January 2016, 1,170 schools have become
inadequate for use due to IDPs occupying schools for shelter or armed groups
controlling the facility. 20
Considering these staggering figures, and the fact that western and southern
regions of Yemen consist of the highest population density, what with the inclusion of
the capital city of Sana’a and large cities such as Al Hudaydah and Taiz, a large
portion of the affected population that is most in need of humanitarian aid is currently
under the control of non-state armed groups. Humanitarian organizations attempting
to aid these populations have faced a significant challenge of access constraints. This
is due to several reasons, which include the security hazards that may risk the lives of
UN personnel. Another issue is the damaged infrastructure such as roads, warehouses,
and highways that is caused by the conflict. Thirdly, there is the challenge of being
granted access by the controlling authority in a particular region. Although the UN
20

Yemen Crisis Overview, OCHA, (2015), available at
http://www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview (last visited Apr 24, 2016).
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should be granted access by the Yemeni government, there remains difficulties in
accessing regions that are controlled by non-state armed groups, who in several cases
restrict the access of humanitarian convoys for their own security or political reasons.
Attempting to gain access without authorization from the designated authority poses a
security hazard on the convoys attempting to reach affected populations. This brings
us to the final challenge, which is the controversy in the recognition of a particular
government as the legitimate authority of the state that should be granting access
authorization to UN agencies. These challenges can largely be attributed to non-state
armed groups’ lack of adherence to international law principles, specifically those of
IHL.
Complementing these practical and legal challenges, the situation in Yemen
exhibits simultaneous political challenges that exacerbate the conflict and demonstrate
the ineffectiveness of the UN at the executive level and the insufficiencies within the
legal framework governing non-state armed groups. It is apparent that the
involvement of the Saudi-led coalition has not deterred the threat of the rebel groups
in Yemen. On the contrary, what is witnessed is that the involvement of a third party
state made the conflict worse on the political front as well as on the ground. This
involvement has led to the more violent emergence of non-state armed groups that
have the aim of combatting foreign intervention. 21 Furthermore, the UN Security
Council (UNSC) has been highly selective in condemning violations of international
law, whether they are IHL violations or general principles of non-intervention. 22
Under international law, the principle of non-intervention should be adhered to in all
conflict situations, except if this intervention is on behalf of the state and will
potentially mitigate the intensity of the conflict or result in finding a political
solution. 23 However, it is evident that this was not nearly the case in Yemen.
21
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The intervention of the Saudi-led coalition, in addition to the overwhelming
support given to Saudi Arabia by the US and UK in financing weaponry, both of
which were approved by the UN, has led to the death and injury of far more civilians
than anticipated. 24 This is where it is evident that the UN has been highly ineffective
in ensuring that a peaceful resolution of the conflict is reached. It is also evident that
the decisions of the UN were based highly on the political dynamics of the system,
which is seen where states and the UN immediately resort to combatting non-state
armed groups militarily. It seems that the rationale behind this kind of decision is that,
under the current framework that governs non-state actors, a political solution may
not be reached with such groups. This means that states are either attempting to use
international law to combat non-state armed groups but are failing, or that
international law itself has failed to provide a legitimate avenue for dealing with such
groups. Either way, the laws, as they are today, are an inefficient mechanism of
governing the interactions between non-state armed groups and other entities. Such a
situation is replicated in the Libyan crisis, where the conflict has involved both a high
level of violence posed by non-state armed groups and ineffectiveness of the UN as a
result of the political dynamics of the international system.
B. Libya
The Libyan conflict began in February 2011 with uprisings spreading throughout
Benghazi and other cities in protest of the despotic regime ruled formerly by President
Muammar Gaddafi. Anti-Gaddafi rebels and security forces engaged in violent
clashes that lasted for several weeks. Just as the Yemen crisis involved a third party
state, NATO was in involved in the Libya crisis. The UN Security Council (UNSC)
was highly involved in attempting to ensure the protection of civilians throughout
Libya. In March 2011, the UNSC condemned the ongoing air strikes and authorized a
no-fly zone over Libya to protect civilians. NATO was responsible for ensuring that
this was enforced, hence their involvement in the conflict. Nevertheless, anti-Gaddafi
rebels had begun seizing territories within Libya, but were constantly defeated by proGaddafi forces that were better armed.
24
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In July 2011, the opposition forces gained enough manpower and weaponry to
take over large segments of Libya. They became known as the National Transitional
Council (NTC) and were then recognized as the legitimate government of Libya by
the International Contact Group on Libya and 60 other countries as well as the
African Union. At the beginning of 2012, however, the NTC had not fulfilled the
promises it made when it assumed power and clashes erupted between former rebel
groups as a result causing the deputy head, Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, to resign. Further
tensions arose when the NTC was split between officials in Benghazi and those in the
center, Tripoli. Those in Benghazi were attempting to reestablish autonomy for the
region, causing a power struggle between authorities. Throughout the first half of
2012, violent clashes occurred between government forces and local militias.
Elections were then held to appease the population, and the General National
Congress (GNC) became the legitimate authority within Libya. Throughout this, local
militia groups and opposition forces were emerging and increasing in numbers and
support to combat other factions and the government.
By 2014, Libya had been witnessing countless factions emerging in the region,
where different factions seized control of pockets of land throughout Libya, just as in
the Yemen crisis. Several militia groups that had emerged to combat the Gaddafi
regime remained in dissent, specifically towards the GNC, which refused to leave its
post after its mandate had expired. The Libyan National Army emerges in the process
to combat the Islamist groups that appeared in Libya at the beginning of 2014 to seize
the opportunity of the power vacuum. A civil war erupts in Libya that causes raids on
government buildings and facilities as well as civilian homes. This was made worse
when a new parliament was elected and pro-GNC factions begin clashing with the
supporters of the new parliament. The deterioration of the security situation led UN
staff to be forced to evacuate from Libya and shut down their operations. Foreigners
also evacuated Libya as embassies were forced to shut down. The international airport
of Tripoli was also significantly damaged by the conflict, making it even more
difficult for people to leave Libya. An Islamist group called Ansar al-Sharia then rose
amidst the conflict to seize control of large portions of Benghazi, whilst the Islamist
Libya Dawn militias controlled most of Tripoli. Other Islamist groups controlled ports
such as the port of Derna in eastern Libya making it increasingly difficult for UN
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convoys and shipments to be delivered into Libya. 25 Libya was effectively split
between the east and the west causing an immense amount of displacement of people.
By 2015, the Islamic State established control over the port-city of Sirte,
which is located along the coast of Libya between Tripoli and Benghazi. UN
organizations that relied on shipments from Turkey were therefore blocked from
sending aid to areas of northern Libya. The Libyan Army attempted to recapture
seized regions but failed on multiple occasions. The new parliament and government
had been forced, since 2014, to base their operations from Tobruk, as several militia
groups captured and continue to clash in the largest two cities of Benghazi and
Tripoli. Militia groups and Islamist militants also began to secure areas rich with
resources throughout Libya. The IS attacked Ras Lanuf oil terminal and attempts to
ensure that the Libyan government is unable to secure its own resources. The main
cities and ports that are highly affected by the conflict and remain insecure are
Benghazi, Tripoli, Misrata, Sirte, Sabha, and Darnah, which are spread out between
the west and the east.
The humanitarian situation in Libya is not all that different from that of
Yemen. The armed conflict has affected more than 3 million people throughout
Libya. Approximately 2.4 million, around 80 percent of the affected population, are in
need of protection and humanitarian assistance. These largely include IDPs, refugees,
asylum-seekers, migrants, and those non-displaced but remain affected by the
conflict. In terms of health care, there is a major shortage in medical supplies and
health care systems. With the remaining supplies, there is still minimal access to such
services. Infrastructure is highly damaged, causing difficulties in transportation for
those trapped amidst the conflict. IDPs are the most affected and vulnerable as a result
of the conflict due to their lack of coping capacity and their loss of assets such as
homes, transportation methods, and basic supplies. Those who are severely affected
are populations situated in the east and south of the country. 26
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Although the Libyan situation is similar to that of Yemen, it is more severe in
terms of access constraints. It is increasingly difficult to estimate the exact number of
those affected in Libya because until today, UN presence in Libya is highly limited.
There are only a handful of missions that go into Libya to assess the security situation
without being able to administer concrete needs assessments. UN agencies currently
operate mostly from Tunisia and through their cooperating partners within the borders
of Libya. Yet, these partners are limited in their capacity of distribution of aid and are
also unable to access certain regions due to safety concerns and the presence of nonstate armed groups. The largest issue facing humanitarian agencies is these groups’
unpredictability and lack of adherence to international law principles. Their attacks
are arbitrary and take little, if any, consideration of civilian life. Much like Yemen,
large portions of the affected population in need of humanitarian assistance is under
the control of non-state armed groups such as in Tripoli and Benghazi. Access
constraints make the situation all the more difficult as well as the issue of damaged
infrastructure and authorization to enter insecure areas, both from the UN and from
non-state state armed groups. Of the most difficult challenges is the controversy in
recognition of the legitimate authority, as is the case of Yemen. In some cases, militia
groups may simply reject authorization to access an area because the UN recognizes
an authority that the militia group opposes. The result is that affected populations are
unable to receive the required assistance. In many instances, there are cases of
civilians dying of starvation, illness, and disease because assistance was not received.
This is where the importance of adhering to the principles of international law
presents itself.
Much like the Yemeni situation, international law has been unable to mitigate
the impact of the conflict. Again, this is highly attributed to the political dynamics
between states as well as the inability of the UN to separate itself from those
dynamics. This has ultimately affected the way in which international law as applied
to the Libyan conflict just as in the Yemeni conflict. There are two main elements in
this context: the first is the significance of government recognition and the second is
the controversy of foreign intervention, both of which affect the application of
international law. Regarding the former, there are a number of factors that affect the
conflict whether operationally or legally depending on which government in Libya is
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recognized as the legitimate government. The significance of government recognition
under international law lies ultimately within the applicability of laws on the different
groups. It also affects the latter, where foreign intervention can be permitted on behalf
of the government in the case of a non-international armed conflict.
With regards to government recognition, the situation is quite tricky and
controversial. Although the Tobruk-based House of Representatives 27 elected in 2014
is the internationally recognized as the government of Libya with considerable
support from the European Union (EU), Egypt, and the UAE, 28 the GNC based in
Tripoli is also considered the legitimate government for other entities such as Qatar,
Sudan, Turkey, and Islamist coalitions such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 29
Nevertheless, the political recognition of the House of Representatives has given this
legitimate government the rights and obligations of a state under international law.
Whereas the government based in Tripoli has not been afforded the same rights or
obligations. In fact, this government has been treated similar to, or considered legally
and politically equal to the Islamist militia groups located within Libya. Furthermore,
a ruling from the Libyan Supreme Court in Tripoli deemed the House of
Representatives unconstitutional and illegal, yet was still recognized internationally
despite any legitimacy that the Supreme Court may hold. 30 This is because the GNC,
on many occasions, has expressed its support to Islamist groups such as Ansar alSharia and ISIS. 31 In this case, the political recognition of the Tobruk government has
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superseded the recognition of the Tripoli government, although the GNC was elected
far before the eastern government was founded. It can be argued that this recognition
is a result of the GNC’s political affiliations with internationally recognized militia
groups, not because of any substantial sovereignty given to the House of
Representatives. Therefore, this political reality has ultimately led to the imposition of
theoretically differentiated laws between the two governments. The legality of such a
situation will be further elaborated on in Chapter IV. 32 Although the UN has made
efforts to reconcile the two factions through putting forth unity treaties and attempting
to create a unified government, it is quite clear that the UN’s affiliations are directed
more to one entity rather than the other. This ultimately negates the alleged neutral
ideologies of the UN simply because certain states refuse to recognize entities that are
affiliated with so-called militia groups. Such is also proven with the second element
discussed here; the approval of foreign intervention on behalf of an internationally
recognized faction over the other.
Foreign intervention has directly resulted in the worsening of the Libyan
conflict, according to a UN representative. 33 There are a number of factors at play, all
of which are caused by political dynamics. Some would argue that the NATO and US
intervention in Libya can be considered a war, in which case the American
administration has been blamed for their reserved attitude towards the whole
intervention. Furthermore, the administration has also been blamed for the financial
burden that this intervention has created on the US economy. The debates surrounding
the rightfulness of the US’s intervention primarily focus on the lack of economic
benefit that the US gained from such a move. Many speculate that considering the
British and US oil companies had begun to control Libyan oil under the Gaddafi
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regime that their intervention was primarily inclined towards protecting their
investment. 34 What this means is that this intervention, under international law, was
not motivated by the need to mitigate the impact of the conflict, but rather was driven
primarily by politically and economically strategic interests of the NATO alliance.
Even if it was to be assumed that the purpose of the intervention was aligned with the
principles of international law, the effect of the intervention was detrimental to the
Libyan population in several ways, some of which include that they have worsened
the overall humanitarian situation in Libya and have increased the presence as well as
level of violence posed by non-state armed groups in the country. 35
In addition, ideally NATO’s intervention should have been made to restore
peace in Libya, hence the UNSC’s authorization of the intervention with Resolution
1973. Considering that NATO is a regional organization, it technically does not fall
under Chapter VII of the Charter, and the intervention is therefore considered “legally
dubious” 36 yet was still authorized by the UNSC. NATO’s involvement was not an
act of self-defense and the organization should have been forbidden from taking
collective offense action in Libya. Therefore, it is clear that the political dynamics of
the international system not only resulted in an unnecessary and purely political
foreign intervention effectively questioning the UN’s effectiveness in restoring peace
in Libya, but also caused an influx of violence as a result of the intervention through
the further emergence of non-state armed groups in the region causing further distress.
This is slightly different from the situation witnessed in Ukraine, as the controversy of
government recognition and foreign intervention are not the main issues.
C. Ukraine
The Ukrainian crisis consists of two main dimensions; the ethnic front and the
political front. The conflict erupted in November 2013 where the Ukrainian
government abandoned their original intent to improve their economic ties with the
EU and resorted to seeking closer ties with Russia. The Ukrainian capital Kiev
witnessed a high number of demonstrations. Russia then provided financial aid to
34
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Ukraine to relieve Ukraine of its economic debt and simultaneously decreased the
prices of Russian gas supply to Ukraine. In response to the protests, the parliament
passed anti-protest laws that were ineffective in dealing with the opposition. Instead,
protesters raided governmental offices and buildings. Any governmental attempts to
appease the Ukrainian population were met with further opposition. Ukrainian
President Yanukovych began to negotiate with opposition forces and signed a
compromise with them in 2014, yet the clashes remained violent. The parliament then
voted to remove the president from power and moved to rally for new elections. AntiRussian sentiments were extended throughout the country both politically and
socially, whilst pro-Russian supporters began to rally as well, mostly in the Eastern
Ukrainian region.
To make matters worse, the Russian parliament approved Russia’s use of
force in Ukraine as a form of protecting Russian interests in Ukraine. Shortly after,
Crimea was annexed to Russia through a referendum and was effectively split from
Ukraine. In the process, protests erupted in Eastern Ukraine demanding independence
of the oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, also known as the Donbas region. Acting
President Turchynov began an anti-terrorist campaign against the pro-Russian
separatists in the Eastern Ukrainian region. The conflict then became largely situated
in Eastern Ukraine where ethnic militia groups took control of the Donbas region.
These militia groups considered themselves of separate from the Ukrainian ethnicity.
Although these are not necessarily intending to join Russia as Crimea did, their
sentiments remained pro-Russian. Militia groups in both regions then declared
independence through a public referendum in attempts to create a separate entity.
Ukraine proceeded to hold presidential elections where Petro Poroshekno was elected
while the east was not involved much in this process. Ties with the EU and Ukraine
were then reinstated and the separatists in Eastern Ukraine continued to act in
violence against Ukrainian forces. Meanwhile, Russia retracted its forces in Ukraine
and the EU and US imposed new sanctions on Russia. Russia remained in support of
the eastern Ukrainian sentiment to secede from Ukraine and considering the lack of
access to aid in eastern Ukraine, the Russian government delivered a large convoy to
Luhansk without authorization from the Ukrainian government.
This political dynamic has been a cause of challenges faced by UN agencies,
including Russia’s empowerment of the separatist groups making it far more difficult
to treat these groups as rebels as opposed to legitimate forces in the international
20

system, who have become both militarily and economically powerful. Russia’s
political and financial support to these groups have created a power struggle between
the government and these entities, which has in turn hindered the ability to restore
peace in Ukraine.
There were several attempts at ceasefire throughout 2014, which were
allegedly finalized when the Ukrainian government and the pro-Russian separatists
signed a truce. To that end, Russian troops withdrew themselves from eastern
Ukraine. Human Rights Watch has shown evidence that the Ukrainian government
violated the truce by attacking areas in Donetsk that are largely populated with
civilians. Finally, separatists in eastern Ukraine elected new leaders with the support
of Russia effectively creating the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk
People’s Republic (LPR). In the peace process attempt, eastern Ukraine has been
deadlocked in a situation of limited resources and access to aid. Russian aid has been
highly compromised due to the sanctions and lack of access to the territory has left
thousands of people insecure well into 2016. 37
This made the humanitarian situation quite severe in the whole of Ukraine.
Although the conflict itself is mainly focused in the Eastern region, the attacks on
other parts of Ukraine have caused large displacement and a lack of access to basic
services. This is specifically true in regions that are surrounding the contact line
between GCAs and NGCAs. As of February 2016, there are approximately 3.7
million people affected by the conflict and an additional 1.75 million who are IDPs. 38
There are approximately 300,000 people at risk of death due to the lack of access to
clean water. 39 Considering Ukraine is more developed than Libya and Yemen, the
humanitarian situation is somewhat less detrimental to the livelihoods of those living
at a far distances from the physical clashes. However, there is a spillover effect in
37
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several parts of Ukraine due to the massive numbers of displaced persons and the lack
of access to areas with resources that affects the livelihoods of individuals who would
otherwise be secure. Furthermore, the constant closure of checkpoints between GCAs
and NGCAs, specifically the Zolote checkpoint, which is an essential yet volatile
crossing between the two areas, has led to a mass displacement of people attempting
to flee the conflict. Other motives for crossing the checkpoint include the attempt to
seek refuge in the GCAs, considering that on several occasions the government of
Ukraine has suspended social payments to IDPs and created an elongated process of
verification for IDP status. Records show that over 720,000 people in March 2016
have crossed through the five main checkpoints across the contact line between the
GCAs and NGCAs. This is a 76 percent increase than the number of people crossing
in February 2016, which amounted to 410,000 crossings. 40 It is therefore evident that
the humanitarian situation throughout Ukraine, whether it is in the GCAs or the
NGCAs, is highly concerning.
Considering the difficulties on the ground, UN agencies have faced a
significant access constraint in both the GCAs and the NGCAs. Overall, this is a
result of the conflict between the separatist non-state armed groups, also referred to as
the de facto authorities of LPR and DPR, and the Ukrainian forces. In specific to the
NGCAs, UN agencies are facing a stringent accreditation process imposed by the de
facto authorities, which makes it severely challenging for humanitarian aid to be
distributed to the affected populations. Also noting that the situation within the GCAs
has deteriorating and as a result, there is an influx of IDPs entering the NGCAs, it
makes it even more difficult for UN agencies to attend to the growing needs of such
populations. Furthermore, there is a consistent closing and reopening of checkpoints
that is a reflection of the political tension between the Ukrainian government and the
de facto authorities. Most recently, the de facto authorities have closed checkpoints to
limit the number of GCA civilians entering their areas. This is because they claim that
the opening of the checkpoint was not coordinated with them by the government. 41
The de facto authorities are also limiting the number of cooperating partners,
mostly local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or international NGOs, that are
granted accreditation in the NGCA. This is largely due to the authorities’ need to
40
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control the goods entering their territory to ensure maximum supervision. It is also
due to the fact that the authorities have requested on multiple occasions for the UN’s
recognition of their independence. Considering UN agencies’ mandates, they are
bound by the UN’s executive recognition of the state, which is usually derived from
Security Council or General Assembly resolutions, and which does not exist in this
case. UN agencies are also bound by their ties and agreements with the Ukrainian
government, which will potentially be severed if a UN agency recognizes the de facto
authorities. This would also harm the UN’s reputation and could also face a restriction
in UN presence in the GCAs of Ukraine, which would defeat the purpose of providing
aid to their populations.
In conclusion, all three crises in Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine face highly
concerning humanitarian situations with their populations having little access to
health care, supplies, food, clean water, among other necessities. They are each
experiencing a high level of IDPs, migrants, and refugees, although the issue of
refugees and migrants is not as pressing in Ukraine; however, the Ukrainian IDP
crisis has resulted in the escalation of the severity of the crisis. UN agencies face
access issues to certain regions within these countries due to the existence of non-state
armed groups that do not adhere to the principles of IHL, which has been made worse
as a result of the political dynamics surrounding the three conflicts. This reality has
caused the access restraints for UN agencies because of safety hazards as well as nonstate armed groups’ reluctance to ensure access for humanitarian organizations to aid
the respective states’ affected populations. This is highly attributed to the gaps in the
laws that govern non-state armed groups as well as the political interests of states that
expand the gap even further.
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III.

NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the three crises of Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine, it is evident that non-state armed
groups are of the main actors in each of the conflicts. Their presence and activities
play key roles in the countries’ political and strategic dynamics. They are also
decisive in curtailing UN access to regions controlled by these groups. It is important
to determine how significant these actors really are in the international system,
whether politically or legally and to assess the extent of the impact that non-state
actors have on the international system. In other words, it is necessary to determine if
the presence of non-state armed groups in armed conflicts and the challenges they
pose to UN agencies are in fact worth the trouble of reforming the international legal
system.
Scholars differ on non-state armed groups’ significance and the perspectives
on their role in international law are diverse. Looking at the significance of non-state
actors in general, there is a general view that the role of the state is diminishing with
the emergence of international organizations, NGOs, and non-state armed groups. 42
This is because they have increased in numbers and political influence throughout the
past decades leading them to become an important part of the decision-making
processes of states. 43 The inclusion of international organizations and NGOs has
become more necessary and significant. Although there has been a relative statistical
reduction in worldwide extreme poverty in the past half-decade and access to
healthcare has improved, 44 there is a still need for such organizations to ensure the
sustainability of those who are subject to falling back into poverty or being faced with
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health care deprivation. 45 Furthermore, with the global increases in war and conflict,
the implications of the refugee, migrant, and displacement crises have also led to a
growing need for these organizations to assist the international community in
alleviating these challenges. 46 Their significance is therefore rising in order to aid
populations in need specifically if their respective governments are not willing or able
to do so. More specifically, the significance of non-state armed groups must be
addressed, as they have a direct role in shaping the politics of the international system
and pose unprecedented challenges for development. 47 Further to this, the
deterioration of the state’s role in international relations has caused a cyclic effect,
resulting in an increase in the number of non-state armed groups further challenging
the existence of the state.
However, considering that non-state armed groups are yet to be involved in
the decision-making processes of state relations specifically in conflict situations, this
view is somewhat flawed. Conversely, NGOs and international organizations have
been much more involved in decision-making processes than non-state armed
groups. 48 This is evident in situations of conflict where states will form peace
agreements with other states and cooperation agreements with international
organizations to ensure that these organizations are able to access the populations in
need. In this instance, states are relying on humanitarian organizations, to some
extent, to ensure the livelihoods of their people are preserved specifically in conflict
situations, and are therefore involved in the decision-making process. The same is not
true for such processes with regards to non-state armed groups. Although it is valid to
argue that non-state armed groups have increased in significance in the international
scene, this does not necessarily decrease the centricity of states within the system of
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international relations in conflict situations. The mere existence of non-state armed
groups follows the same pattern of increasing numbers as that of NGOs and
international organizations; however, the difference is that these non-state armed
groups are armed and may represent a particular dissenting belief towards a state.
This is why states are resistant to including non-state armed groups in the decisionmaking processes; because they threaten the legitimacy of the regime. 49 Thus, there is
a requirement of state consent under international law to incorporate non-state armed
groups into the political process, which effectively still qualifies the state as the main
actor under international law. 50
Noting a different view, some scholars argue that non-state armed groups are
simply a byproduct of the international system and their existence is of little
consequence amidst a system governed by states. 51 They believe that the international
system will continue to be governed by states, as one of the pinnacles of international
law is the protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which must be
safeguarded by the international community regardless of the existence of non-state
armed groups. 52 The establishment of state sovereignty and its protection were further
codified through the creation and implementation of the UN Charter in 1945, which
was founded by states to protect states. International law was further developed
through custom to protect states against non-state armed groups, specifically those
with terrorizing nature. 53 This is assuming that the state is consistently more powerful
both politically and militarily than a non-state armed group. However, since the
eruption of the Arab Spring, it is evident that non-state armed groups have had the
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ability to mobilize and gain support more vigorously than expected. They have also
had access to technology and weaponry that is unprecedented, some of which have
been financed and endorsed by Western countries, effectively causing a more
complex political dynamic that requires serious attention. 54 In that light, the growing,
if not resurgent, 55 power of non-state armed groups cannot be neglected, as their
presence and power has affected state sovereignty on more than one occasion.
Non-state armed groups specifically, and NGOs and international
organizations generally, are therefore equally significant in the international relations
as states are, as they play a major role in creating the political, economic, and social
dynamics between states. Each of the roles of non-state armed groups and states must
be acknowledged and dealt with according to their particular structure and demands.
This is not to say that the violent acts of non-state armed groups should be met with
appeasement, but rather it must be acknowledged that their ability to affect
international politics and compromise state sovereignty is becoming increasingly
alarming. The attitude that states have towards non-state armed groups as simply a
byproduct of the system or a violent group that should be met with violence is no
longer the most effective method of dealing with the present reality. Both parties must
interact with one another in light of the rising importance of non-state armed
groups. 56
Therefore, this coordination and integration is essential for the continued
functioning of the international system and the ability for all entities to have some sort
of relationship with one another, including humanitarian organizations and non-state
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armed groups. Because humanitarian organizations are only able to function through
state consent, it is imperative that states be willing to integrate non-state armed groups
within the system so as to achieve that end. The alternative would be to impose upon
states a reformed system that acknowledges non-state armed groups’ presence without
requesting their consent. However, this would prove to be an immensely difficult task.
Therefore, approaching the rise of non-state armed groups through the lens of
reciprocity between them and humanitarian organizations will support the process of
reassessing the legal framework governing non-state armed groups.
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IV.

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

International law has proven to be a double-edged sword in governing the operations
of UN agencies. On the one hand, it has given agencies the ability to perform their
operations in crisis situations in the hopes of fulfilling their humanitarian mandate.
Within this particular context, IHL has provided UN agencies with the platform to
form agreements with states in order to enter their borders and provide humanitarian
assistance to their people during times of conflict. It has also granted certain
protections and immunities for UN agencies and their personnel such as ensuring their
safety and mobility throughout the conflict areas. More often than not, international
law has therefore obliged both states and UN agencies to adhere to the provisions that
regulate their conduct in conflict situations, although there are the rare situations
where responsibility can be evaded. 57
In other circumstances, however, international law has impeded the operating
ability of UN agencies. Although there exists a framework that allows humanitarian
agencies to operate within a state-centric system, it has failed to provide a sufficient
legal framework governing the conduct of non-state armed groups and their
interaction with humanitarian agencies. As a result, UN agencies have faced access
difficulties in areas that are controlled by non-state armed groups.
A. Non-State Armed Groups under International Law
After establishing the significance of non-state armed groups in international relations
and determining the level of effectiveness the UN has in terms of humanitarian aid in
crisis situations, it is equally important to assess the significance of non-state armed
groups under the framework of international law. Understanding where international
law situates non-state armed groups within its provisions will allow for the
identification of the gaps in the framework that will in turn create a platform for the
implementation of a reform process. These gaps are identified through the rather
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pragmatic approach of determining the laws that apply to a particular situation or
conflict and if there is a significant amount of controversy between legal scholars
surrounding the law in that context, 58 then there is effectively a gap in the system.
Understanding how international law defines non-state armed groups will support this
process.
There is the view that non-state armed groups, under the provisions of
international law, remain subject to state actions and state jurisdiction under
international law. 59 This means that non-state armed groups should not fall under the
jurisdiction of international law unless an international crime is committed where the
act can be attributable to a state. Otherwise, the domestic laws of a state should
govern the actions of non-state armed groups belonging to that state. This is
considered a classical view that assumes that non-state armed groups are not active in
cross-border conflicts. However, in light of the cases of Yemen and Libya
specifically, the trend that is being witnessed is quite the contrary. Non-state armed
groups have become an international entity that is generally not attributable to one
particular state. 60 If this narrow definition were used, it would be problematic to
situate non-state armed groups under the provisions of international law considering
that several states would be held accountable for the actions of one group of people,
which seems illogical to say the least. Furthermore, more often than not, the non-state
armed group that emerges from one state actually opposes that state or is demanding
independence and became a de facto state, such as in the case of Ukraine, making it
also unreasonable to hold the contracting state accountable for its actions. Therefore,
situating non-state armed groups under domestic jurisdiction unless an international
crime is committed (which is governed by a different set of laws than those of IHL)
seems implausible.
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The more convincing approach dictates that non-state armed groups are
governed by different laws than that of the state’s if they meet certain conditions
stipulated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 along with their Additional Protocols,
which govern their responsibilities. 61 However, these responsibilities differ according
to the context of the conflict. The Geneva Conventions will differentiate between
armed conflicts that are international and those that are non-international. There is an
importance here to qualify these conflicts as international or non-international
because this will allow us to determine which laws generally apply to these conflicts,
which will only apply to all those who are parties to the Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols. 62
B. International and Non-International Armed Conflicts
International armed conflicts (IAC) are governed by a different set of laws than noninternational armed conflicts (NIAC). Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions
governs IACs and is considered the traditional type of conflict. It is defined as
“declared war or any other armed conflict” with “two or more of the High Contracting
Parties”. 63 This also includes armed conflict within occupied territories. Additional
Protocol I of 1977 adds another scenario to what would qualify as an IAC, which is
the resistance of national liberation movements against a state under Article 1(4), if
such a state is party to the treaty. 64 The Geneva Conventions as a whole then govern
the conduct of states in IACs after the conflict has been qualified as such.
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The governance of NIACs is much more limited, as only Common Article 3
governs the conduct of parties to the conflict. Additional Protocol II should also
govern the NIAC if this law applies, which is based on very particular conditions.
Thus, there is a need to understand if a conflict with one or more of the parties is a
non-state armed group that performs cross-border operations is considered an IAC or
a NIAC.
C. Treaty Law
Looking at the sources of IHL, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional
Protocols have created a mechanism for governing IACs and NIACs. For these laws
to apply to a conflict, the parties to the conflict must be parties to the Conventions and
their Protocols individually. In all three conflicts, the states are State Parties to the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols I and II, with Ukraine also being a
State Party to Additional Protocol III, and are therefore all applicable to this
analysis. 65 It must be noted, however, that the analysis presented is not restricted to
these examples, but presents a general understanding of the relationship between
international law, non-state armed groups, and humanitarian organizations under the
provisions that apply to State Parties.
These sources of law have governed the relationship between the state and
non-state armed groups in certain instances, where combat between both parties is
regulated. In other instances it has governed the relationship between the law and
non-state armed groups, where non-state armed groups must adhere to a particular set
of laws governing their behavior on the ground, although there is yet to be an
applicable mechanism for holding these groups accountable for violations. 66 The issue
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of state-centricity here is important because in both cases, the stipulations presented in
such frameworks feature the state as the primary actor in the international system.
International law’s main focus and theoretical inclination towards non-state armed
groups is two-fold: firstly, it focuses on attributing the acts of non-state armed groups
to a state 67 and secondly, it expects non-state armed groups to adhere to international
law principles without providing them with the same privileges provided to states. 68
This is not to say that non-state armed groups should be legally equated to states;
however, it is important to note that international law’s expectation that non-state
armed groups should be obligated and held accountable under the same conditions as
those of states is unreasonable, to say the least. That said, these two factors that
international law has focused on have ultimately directed its attention away from
improving the framework that governs non-state armed groups in the international
legal system.
Regarding the recognition of non-state armed groups under IHL, within the
general spirit of the Geneva Conventions in both IACs and NIACs, 69 it is evident that
the status of non-state armed groups can only be elevated to insurgents or belligerents
so as to be granted any legal character, and therefore legal obligations and rights.
However, these rights are in fact not granted to non-state armed groups. The
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foundation of international law is based on consent and reciprocity, 70 which means
that states give their consent to be bound by international law principles and in return,
they receive protections and guarantees under international law. In contrast,
international law obliges non-state armed groups to adhere to some international law
principles without their expressed consent and does not provide them with the same
protections and guarantees. Prior to the enactment of the Geneva Conventions and its
Additional Protocols, non-state armed groups, or rebels, were considered international
subjects depending on the contracting state’s recognition of them as either insurgents
or belligerents. Depending on the type of recognition, the group’s international rights
and obligations were clear under international law: they “became assimilated to a
state actor with all the attendant rights and obligations which flow from the laws of
international armed conflict.” 71 With the subsequent enactment of the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols, non-state armed groups then became automatically
bound by international obligations under IHL independent of their recognition as
belligerents. 72
On the other hand, the laws that govern NIACs will bind non-state armed
groups in situations where the state does not recognize them as insurgents or
belligerents. If the state were to recognize non-state armed groups as belligerents,
they would be granted combatant status under the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, which they are now reluctant to do. States avoid admitting that they
have lost control over certain areas of land within the state leading them to refuse to
admit that the conflict is an IAC and grant groups with the status of belligerency
under international law. 73 This is because in IACs, there is an obligation for all parties
to the conflict to protect civilians and grant prisoners of war their rights under IHL.
Under the framework of NIACs, there is no privilege for prisoners of war or
combatant privilege. An individual from a non-state armed group is simply treated as
70
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a criminal and tried under national courts. Common Article 3 only provides limited
protection of these groups. 74 This becomes problematic when international
obligations should be adhered to but rights are not granted to these groups. This lack
of reciprocity effectively creates a gap in the system, as there can be no obligation on
a non-state armed group to discriminate between civilian and combatant when
targeting the opposition without creating the same combatant privilege for the
members of such a group. Therefore, not only are the laws insufficient but, given the
current structure of the international legal system, their application is almost
impossible, hence the non-state armed groups’ lack of adherence to such principles.
Nevertheless, it is important to assess the laws that govern non-state armed
groups under the provisions that govern both IACs and NIACs. Specifically regarding
the provisions that govern IACs, the assessment will be limited to those that address
“each party to the conflict” 75 in the case that the conflict is qualified as an IAC but
involves a non-state armed group. Provisions that do not address each party to the
conflict are primarily addressed to states and, for the purposes of this research, it is
only significant to address articles that apply to non-state armed groups.
D. The Applicability of the Laws of a NIAC
Both Common Article 3 and potentially Additional Protocol II may be applied in this
type of armed conflict.
a. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
Addressing Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions regarding conflicts not of
an international character, or in other words a NIAC, the article binds “each Party to
the conflict” to apply provisions regarding the protection of persons who no longer
take part in the hostility and treat them in a humane manner without discrimination. 76
It prohibits particular acts that both parties must refrain from committing, among
other provisions. The importance of this article is that it binds all parties to the
conflict, to which states have consented to being bound by. There are several issues
with the applicability of this article. The first is, as mentioned, the conventional nature
74
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of the article, which assumes that the NIAC will be contained within the state and will
thus only include a government in conflict with a militia group. This disregards the
possibility of the non-state armed group emerging from another state, or several
groups combatting several governments. The second issue is that non-state armed
groups, as opposed to states, have not given their consent to be bound by such a
provision and because the Geneva Conventions are state-centric, there is no
accountability clause that applies to non-state armed groups. It can be assumed that
non-state armed groups would only adhere to international law principles if they were
being granted rights under these laws, or if they were to be held accountable for
violations through some sort of penalizing mechanism. Both of these options are not
present in the current legal system. Any sort of penalizing such as the imposition of
sanctions will ultimately affect the state in which the non-state armed group resides
and its population, causing harm on the state and its people who may not even be
involved in the conflict.
With regards to Common Article 3(2), the provision binds all parties to the
conflict to allow “an impartial humanitarian body” 77 to offer its services to the
wounded and sick of the parties to the conflict. Although this article is quite vague,
this means that both states and non-state armed groups should allow the humanitarian
organization to support populations in need. However, as mentioned, it is unlikely that
the non-state armed group would adhere to such a provision, as it has not consented to
being bound by such laws. Furthermore, the article provides that the parties to the
conflict should attempt to “bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or
part of the other provisions of the present Convention”. It also adds “The application
of the preceding provision shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.” This is quite contradictory of the idea of a NIAC, where the non-state armed
group is not considered a legitimate force and is therefore unable to enter into
agreements. This is further reaffirmed by the fact that applying these provisions will
not alter the non-state armed group’s legal personality. The law is therefore insisting
that non-state armed groups will remain illegitimate and unrecognized as an entity
other than an illegal combatant. Hence, it is not surprising that non-state armed groups
would not adhere to such a provision.
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b. Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions
Regarding the application of Additional Protocol II (AP II), there are stringent laws
that allow for the applicability of the Protocol. Firstly, the state where the NIAC is
taking place should be a State Party to AP II. Secondly, the non-state armed group or
rebel group must be in control of a significant portion of the territory within the state.
In all three conflicts discussed, the three states are all State Parties of the Protocol. 78
Furthermore, as presented, non-state armed groups in all three conflicts have
significant control over territories within the state. Therefore, AP II’s provisions
would apply to all three conflicts. It is important to note that AP II attempts to impose
all of the regulations of an IAC in a NIAC with several exceptions that do not apply to
a NIAC because of its nature as a predominantly domestic conflict.
Under Article 3 of the Protocol, there is a provision of non-intervention by
other states in order to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state in
which the conflict is taking place. This article is quite controversial because it
assumes that there is no justification for intervention in the conflict. However, as will
be discussed in the coming section, there are situations where a state may intervene in
a NIAC with the consent of the government. The idea for non-intervention is for the
third party state to refrain from impeding the contracting state’s sovereignty;
therefore, if the contracting state provides its consent for the third party state to
intervene, it is therefore willingly giving up its sovereignty to the other state. 79
The same is not true if the third party state is intervening on behalf of the nonstate armed group because, in this case, the non-state armed group is combatting the
state and if the third party state is intervening on its behalf it is, therefore, also
combatting the state. This would turn the conflict into a conflict between two states
and would eventually be qualified as an IAC. It must be noted that this situation
assumes a strict identity between the regime and the state. During a civil war, this
identity is necessarily challenged. Therefore, this situation would be controversial
when assessing a case such as Libya’s, where there is a divide regarding the
78
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recognition of the legitimate government. Again, there is a further gap in the legal
system, whereby it is assumed that the differentiation between state and rebel groups
will be clearly identified as such, which the situation in Libya has proven is rarely the
case. International law, therefore, does not attend to a situation where the legitimacy
of the regime is challenged and the identity of the state is skewed. Therefore, this
provision somehow results in the protection of the internationally recognized regime
(which in the Libya case is the Western-recognized) and its sovereignty as it is
identified as the contracting state, effectively disregarding the rights of the non-state
armed group and making it biased towards the state. This further affirms the argument
of the state-centricity of international law, which should be reformed to incorporate
the rights of non-state armed groups in order to facilitate fairness in the application of
the laws. This would benefit UN agencies in such that it may provide incentives for
non-state armed groups to begin adhering to such principles.
Article 4 of the Protocol imposes fundamental guarantees on the parties to the
conflict to ensure that those who are not taking part in the hostilities should be treated
humanely. Both the state and non-state armed groups should adhere to this provision;
however, in all three crises, both parties violate this provision incessantly by
undertaking violent acts against those who are not directly taking part in hostilities
and do not provide children with the care and aid that they require. The issue here is
that there is no method of accountability to hold non-state armed groups to. 80 If the
state adheres to this principle, the non-state armed group may not reciprocate. This
reinstates the idea that non-state armed groups have not consented to being bound by
such a provision. Instead, the provisions that the contracting state has consented to are
applied to non-state armed groups who are criminalized for violating them. Through a
human rights perspective, this is of course ideal, considering that these provisions
should always be upheld in order to safeguard the lives of individuals who are not
considered combatants. However, from a legal perspective, the system does not entitle
non-state armed groups to the same rights as that of the state and should therefore is
unrealistic for assuming that the same obligations should be adhered to. In this case,
UN agencies are unable to receive their right to attend to the needs of affected
populations because the system does not provide the state’s rights to non-state armed
groups and their theoretical obligations are therefore not adhered to.
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Looking at Article 5 of the Protocol, it imposes guarantees for those who have
been deprived of their liberty as a result of the armed conflict. It also adds in Article
1(b) that affected persons should “be provided with food and drinking water and be
afforded safeguards as regards health and hygiene…” and in Article 1(d) “they shall
be allowed to receive individual or collective relief”. Because the article does not
specify who should be providing this type of aid, it insinuates that humanitarian
organizations could be those undertake this responsibility. They should therefore be
granted access to provide relief to those whose liberties have been restricted, and this
should apply to both the state and non-state armed groups.
Part IV of the Protocol, specifically Articles 13 – 18, ensures the protection of
the civilian population. It is essentially an emulation of the Fourth Geneva
Convention on the protection of civilians. This article should apply to both the state
and the non-state armed group; therefore, the non-state armed group should ensure
that it is adhering to the principle of distinction between civilian and combatant. In
reality, specifically in the three crises discussed, this does not happen. Both states and
non-state armed groups, more often than not, violate the principle of distinction and
do not protect civilians, much like their violations of Article 4. As a member state,
there is a mechanism of accountability regarding their actions, which includes being
sanctioned by the Security Council as they see fit. However, there is no method of
international accountability for non-state armed groups under the Protocol. Although
sanctions could greatly harm a non-state armed group within a particular territory,
these sanctions would be imposed on the state as a whole, which, as mentioned in the
previous section, would affect the entire population and is therefore not an effective
mechanism of accountability. Ideally, the state’s national courts should try them;
however, when the conflicts become so severe as those in Yemen, Libya, and
Ukraine, and in light of the groups’ rising power, it becomes very difficult to try
criminals in domestic courts. Therefore, this element within the governance of the
conduct of non-state actors should be revisited. The adherence of non-state armed
groups to the principle of distinction would benefit UN agencies in such that it would
ultimately alleviate the severity of the conflict on affected populations, which would
highly support the UN’s mandate. In addition, regarding access, if a non-state armed
group is adhering to the principle of distinction in order to protect civilians, it can be
assumed that they will be inclined to provide access to UN agencies to attend to the
needs of their populations.
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Article 18 specifically addresses relief societies and relief actions, whereby it states
in clause 1 that humanitarian organizations “may offer their services for the
performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed
conflict”. Furthermore, Article 18(2) states that:
If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack
of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and
medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are
of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are
conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken
subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned. 81
This article is directly applicable to the issue being discussed. It explicitly mentions
that humanitarian organizations should be granted access to the territory for the
purposes of attending to the medical and nutritional needs of the affected civilian
population. This is limited to the consent of the contracting party without taking into
account a scenario where the non-state armed group may be in control of a particular
part of that territory. Theoretically, the humanitarian agency should not be requesting
access to any part of the territory from any actor other than the government because of
this particular provision. However, this has proven to cause several practical
challenges for UN agencies including access. This is not to assume that the situation
is uncontroversial; on the contrary, legal provisions restrict UN agencies’ ability to
recognize non-state armed groups let alone obtain consent to enter their territory. At
the same time, it is impractical to assume that UN agencies will not request access
from non-state armed groups in order to distribute their aid. In that situation, UN
agencies are still limited by this provision and all other provisions specifically
ensuring state sovereignty is not impeded. This is a clearly identifiable gap in the
system whereby the law does not explicitly bind non-state armed groups to adhere to
granting access to UN agencies and UN agencies are simultaneously bound by the
principles of maintaining state sovereignty.
Bearing these provisions in mind, it must be noted that there is a significant
gap in the applicability of the law that governs NIACs with regards to the conduct of
non-state armed groups. This is because the law is predominantly state-centric and
therefore disregards the rights that the non-state armed groups should be entitled to if
they are to be bound by the same obligations. It is also important to note that non-state
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armed groups have not consented to be bound by these provisions and it is therefore
not surprising that they have not consistently adhered to them. Finally, UN agencies
must adhere to a set of obligations that restricts their interaction with non-state armed
groups outside of the state-centric setting. This becomes even more difficult in a
conflict where Additional Protocol II does not apply. This would mean that Common
Article 3 is the only article that governs the NIAC, which is quite limited by essence.
UN agencies are still bound in principle to a state-centric system, but non-state armed
groups are then bound to generic provisions that insist that their legal personality will
not change.
After addressing the gaps in the legal system that governs NIACs, and
considering that it is possible for an armed conflict involving a non-state actor to be
considered an IAC, it is important to assess the legal framework that governs nonstate armed groups in an IAC.
E. The Applicability of the Laws of an IAC
All of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions should apply to IACs. However,
considering that the study is limited to the applicability of non-state actors, as
mentioned, only the articles that address all parties to the conflict will be studied. But
first it is important to understand if the involvement of non-state armed groups in a
conflict may still qualify as an IAC.
Looking at the applicability of Common Article 2 that governs IACs, the
article restricts the definition of such a conflict to states, so it must be determined
whether non-state armed groups would be given the same legal characteristics as the
state. Under the general provisions of the Geneva Conventions, non-state armed
groups are simply persons carrying arms. The terminology of the law does not
specifically distinguish between civilians and non-state armed groups, but
distinguishes between those carrying arms and those not carrying arms. Those not
carrying arms during an armed conflict should be protected by IHL, whilst persons
carrying arms who are not part of the state security apparatus are considered illegal
combatants and are given the status of insurgents or belligerents depending on the
state’s recognition of the group as previously mentioned. The status of belligerency is
also governed under international law. But, as noted, the status of belligerency is only

41

limited to IACs. 82 Hence, it is evident that the criterion for an IAC is not applicable to
non-state armed groups in this instance and specifically within the three cases
presented. They are therefore not granted the status of belligerency. Furthermore,
Common Article 2 is not applicable to these groups, as they are not considered state
parties for several reasons, which include that they do not fit the criteria of statehood
and they have not signed or ratified any treaties that would grant them the same rights
or obligations as a state.
With regards to provisions that govern IACs that bind each party to the
conflict, Article 45 of the First Geneva Convention and Article 46 of the Second
Geneva Convention state, “Each Party to the conflict, acting through its commandersin-chief, shall ensure the detailed execution of the preceding Articles…” However,
the preceding articles with the Geneva Conventions do not all apply to non-state
armed groups, even if the conflict is classified as an IAC. For example, Article 17 of
the Third Geneva Convention binds each party to the conflict with regards to the
questioning of prisoners insofar as the conflict is international. This is because it
assumes that any prisoners of war are captured combatants of the opposing state’s
armed forces. This is not the case in a conflict that involves non-state armed groups,
as the armed group is not classified as a state. Any captured prisoners from a nonstate armed group would not be considered a prisoner of war considering they do not
qualify as such under Common Article 4. Although under Common Article 4(2),
prisoners of war may be classified as those who are “members of other militias and
members of other volunteer corps”, they must be attributed to a party to the conflict
and fulfill stringent conditions, most notably the conditions of “having a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance” 83 and “conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war”. 84 These conditions are in many cases
not applicable to the particular conflict, which is in fact the case in several conflicts
studied. Regardless of the applicability of such a provision, the adherence to such an
article (or lack thereof) will not affect the access constraints that UN agencies face.
They are simply a reflection of the inapplicability of a significant number of laws to a
conflict that involve non-state armed groups.
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Because it has become difficult to categorize the conflict, it is equally difficult
to apply the relevant laws. Even if the conflict qualified as an IAC, this would only be
the case because of the involvement of another state within the conflict, and the
provisions of IHL would apply to the two states and not the non-state armed group.
Thus, there could actually be two conflicts simultaneously occurring: a NIAC
between the rebels and the government, and an IAC between two states. The laws that
govern the NIAC would theoretically be the only laws that the non-state armed group
would be bound by.
However, we are still faced with difficulty in applying the laws of a NIAC
when a non-state armed group practices cross-border operations, or its activities
become so extensive that it involves more than one non-state armed group within
several territories and international personalities. At the same time, it is inaccurate to
apply the laws of an IAC on non-state armed groups because they are not considered
states and are therefore not afforded similar rights or obligations. The inability to
qualify such a conflict is what leads to the inability to apply the correct laws. The
Tadić case of the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
provides a reference for the qualification of conflicts that involve non-state armed
groups. 85 It is evident that a conflict will be considered a NIAC if it involves the
government of a state and rebels within the territory of the state. If a second state
intervenes in a NIAC, it can only do so with the consent of the government. The
conflict will remain a NIAC because both states will become one party to the conflict
against a rebel group. This is the mainstream opinion of scholars who believe that this
type of conflict is still a NIAC because it involves non-state actors who do not qualify
as states and therefore may not possess their international character. 86 On the other
hand, if a state intervenes on behalf of the rebel group, the conflict becomes an IAC
with dual nature, 87 because the second state intervened without the consent of the
state where the conflict is occurring. In this case, there are two states in conflict and
the laws of an IAC apply. This type of qualification accurately illustrates the ways in
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which the system of international law is greatly state centric. The qualification of the
conflict is predominantly based on where the state is situated within the conflict.
F. The Applicability of Both Doctrines
In a situation where a non-state armed group is intervening in a conflict between a
state and another non-state armed group, such as in Libya, international law is unable
to qualify such a conflict. Or if the scenario includes that more than one non-state
armed group originate from different states and are in conflict with rebel groups and
the government of another state, international law is still unable to qualify this
conflict. The Ukrainian conflict may be qualified as an IAC, considering Russia
intervened on behalf of the rebels against the Ukrainian government; however, when
Russian troops withdrew and the conflict continued between the rebels and the
Ukrainian government, it is still difficult to qualify the conflict as a NIAC. This is
because the separatists continue to receive political and financial assistance from
Russia 88 and some states recognize the separatists to be independent. 89
Consequently, it is more convincing to consider a conflict that involves
several non-state armed groups and a group of states both a NIAC and an IAC. Some
interpretations have assumed that these types of conflict are called “transnational
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armed conflicts”, 90 where there is armed conflict between non-state actors across
borders. In this case, international law could attempt to apply both the laws of IACs
and NIACs simultaneously; however, there are several issues with applying doctrines
simultaneously. The first is that some laws may contradict one another because the
parties will be operating at different standards.
For example, states are bound by the protection of civilians under the Fourth
Geneva Convention whilst if Additional Protocol II does not apply in a particular
conflict, the non-state armed group may not be equally bound by the same provisions.
The clearest example is the one that this paper discusses, whereby states are bound by
ensuring humanitarian access for organizations, and while international law
theoretically binds non-state armed groups to certain provisions in an IAC or a NIAC,
ensuring humanitarian access for organizations is not one of them. As mentioned,
under Article 18 of APII, the High Contracting Party is the party that provides consent
for the humanitarian organization to enter the territory and provide assistance to the
civilian population. The law mentions nothing about the territory that falls under the
control of a non-state armed group. Although this is technically still considered the
territory of the state, it is unwise to assume that the non-state armed group will adhere
to the provisions directed towards the state that effectively empowers the state during
conflict. Practically and realistically, there remains areas of state territory controlled
by non-state armed groups and because of the structure of the law being state-centric,
it does not provide for any regulations that theoretically or practically bind non-state
armed groups to provide access to humanitarian organizations. In any event, even if
such a law exists, there is difficulty in binding non-state armed groups to it
considering, again, the nature of the system that involves a lack of reciprocity with
non-state armed groups whether the laws applied are those of an IAC or a NIAC. For
these reasons, it is even more difficult to consider the conflict both an IAC and a
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NIAC. This shows that the doctrine for governing non-state armed groups under IHL
is both insufficient and practically inapplicable.
While there are several modes of attempting to govern non-state armed
groups, they have not been successful in ensuring that UN agencies are able to access
populations in NGCAs in order to fulfill their mandate. In particular to all three cases
of Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine that were previously discussed, militia groups control
certain pockets of land in their countries and are either asking for independence,
control of the government, or are fighting for a particular cause or belief. When
international law classifies these cases as IACs and/or NIACs based on the criteria
stipulated in the Geneva Conventions, certain laws will apply to each case where
there are benefits and responsibilities for all parties, including humanitarian agencies.
Under IHL, the state has obligations towards humanitarian agencies, whereas the
provisions of IHL only govern non-state armed groups’ relations with the state or with
the law, and even then, these regulations are insufficient. At the same time,
humanitarian agencies are strictly bound by international law principles making it
difficult for them to interact with non-state armed groups in a legal setting, as nonstate armed groups are not reciprocally bound. 91 This is because humanitarian
agencies are in a position of institutional constraints, whereby there is high
importance in maintaining the reputation of a humanitarian agency and ensuring that
their mandate remains neutral and by the book of international law so as to ensure that
as many states as possible cooperate with them. This constrains them from being able
to interact with non-state armed groups, as in several situations the state may sever its
ties with the organization claiming that it possesses political affiliations with the
enemy of the state. 92
This is where the obstacle of access presents itself in international law.
Through these case studies, these obstacles are portrayed and have allowed for a
clearer perception of what needs to be amended in the legal framework that governs
non-state armed groups in order to make it more applicable to crisis situations. The
ultimate goal of these amendments is to provide an avenue for UN agencies to legally
interact with non-state armed groups whilst somehow ensuring that non-state armed
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groups will adhere to some, if not all, IHL principles. Reaching this goal would allow
for UN agencies to be granted access to NGCAs and would also hold non-state armed
groups accountable for their actions towards UN agencies. This would be for the
purposes of protecting UN agencies and their personnel in NCGAs whilst
simultaneously allowing them to access populations in need, hence the importance of
the reciprocity of the system.
However, there is an argument made by some international lawyers that the
laws that govern armed conflicts as a whole are considered customary international
law and should apply to all conflicts, whether it is international or non-international.
This also means that these laws should bind all parties, including non-state armed
groups. 93 Other scholars argue the contrary. In the next section, several views will be
presented on whether considering these laws custom will resolve the issue of their
insufficiency and inapplicability.
G. Customary International Law
There exist several perspectives regarding non-state armed groups’ obligations under
the framework of customary international law. It suggests that the current legal
framework that governs armed conflicts applies to non-state armed groups, as it falls
under customary international law principles that non-state armed groups are required
to adhere to. 94 This insinuates that access challenges faced by UN agencies exist due
to the lack of adherence of non-state armed groups to the general principles enshrined
under customary international law and not because these principles do not exist. Some
of these principles include that all parties to the conflict should ensure the protection
of civilians, adhere to the principle of distinction, and ensure access and safety to
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humanitarian agencies and their personnel, among other principles. 95 In other words,
non-state armed groups do not necessarily have to be bound by the treaties that
govern IHL because customary international law itself holds them accountable. The
violations of such principles are therefore a reflection of the bad conduct of non-state
armed groups rather than a measurement of the effectiveness of the current
framework governing their behavior. 96 This is similar to the view of those discussing
UN effectiveness, where it is argued that the obstacles of UN agencies are attributable
to the conduct of non-state armed groups themselves rather than the level of UN
effectiveness. Regardless of this attribution, this perspective maintains that the
framework governing non-state armed groups’ conduct falls under customary
international principles, and the obstacles faced by UN agencies are a result of bad
politics and not gaps in the law. 97
However, the practical situation of UN operations has proven that although
there are attempts to bind non-state armed groups to international law principles
through customary international law, there remains an access issue for UN agencies in
conflict areas. There are a majority of non-state armed groups that are currently not
adhering to principles that grant UN agencies access. This perspective takes on a
more pragmatic approach and suggests that the reason that non-state armed groups do
not adhere to the principles of customary international law is because they were not
involved in the process of creating them. 98 Customary international law is created
through state practice and opinio juris, 99 which disregards the practices of non-state
armed groups. Therefore, non-state armed groups do not feel a sense of obligation
towards these laws and are consequently not inclined to follow them.
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Again, this assumes that the cohesiveness of the identity of the regime and the
state. However, the regimes that were involved in the negotiations of the Geneva
Conventions in 1949 are no longer the same actors today, yet the state remains bound
by such provisions. Therefore, the actions of the regimes nowadays can be considered
customary international law and will change over time, which may or may not involve
non-state armed groups’ actions. But the most prevalent aspect that has consistently
been a challenge to the application of law on non-state armed groups is the absence of
reciprocity of obligations and rights for non-state armed groups. The same applies to
non-member states, where the provisions of custom are theoretically applied to states
who are not party to the treaties. In this case, the same contradictions apply to nonmember states, where their involvement in creating custom in this context is
inexistent and there is therefore no reciprocity in the system where obligations
imposed on non-member states will be faced with rights granted to them.
Looking at the situation on the ground, if one could argue that the general
principles that apply to an IAC should apply to non-state armed groups because they
are considered customary law principles, in practice non-state armed groups would
not adhere to international law principles specifically those of an IAC if they were not
being granted the same rights as states in exchange for obligations. This is where it is
reasonable to say that there is a gap in the system of governance of non-state armed
groups, which need to be reassessed. 100 In addition, non-state armed groups are
considerably unaware of these principles, as they have not been integrated into the
system of the knowledge of international law. 101 Thus, the existence of customary
international law’s governance of the conduct of non-state armed groups is of little
consequence to the reality of their actions and therefore the reality of the access
challenges that UN agencies face.
Despite this seemingly pessimistic reality, non-state armed groups could
potentially adhere to the principles of customary international law if there was a legal
framework that integrated them within the system. This ultimately means that they
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should become recognized actors in global affairs. 102 This does not mean that nonstate armed groups should be equated to states in responsibility and obligation, but
rather there should have their own separate framework that is tailored to their needs
and the needs of the international system. Therefore, what is suggested is a system of
reciprocity between international law and the non-state armed groups, whereby
international law grants non-state armed groups particular rights and non-state armed
groups are required to adhere to fundamental principles in international law.
Although this paper argues that the reason for the UN’s access challenges to
certain regions in conflict is due to the insufficiencies of the current legal framework
governing non-state armed groups, it is equally important to assess the role of the UN
as an organization in conflict situations. It must be recognized that there lies a
complementary argument for their challenges, which suggests that a reason for
agencies’ access drawbacks is the level of the UN’s ineffectiveness as an
organization. The UN’s executive and operational role in conflict situations has been
shaped by the political dynamics of the international system and has therefore played
a major role in causing access challenges for agencies. This is because such political
dynamics have greatly affected the current state-centric structure of international law
and the way in which it is is being implemented on the ground. As a result, this has
caused several inefficiencies in interacting with non-state armed groups, eventually
causing a gap in the system.
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V.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

As has been generally discussed in the case studies aforementioned, the role of the
United Nations in the issue of UN agencies’ access challenges is quite significant.
The UN has proven to have both a positive and negative impact on the ability for UN
agencies to access populations in need. Its role has also affected the implementation
of international law principles and the stagnancy of the laws that govern non-state
armed groups. UN effectiveness on the executive and operational levels have been
continuously questioned in crisis situations. There are those who believe that the UN
has failed in effectiveness due to its executive structure, what with the UNSC’s
permanent five members spearheading any and all matters related to conflict
situations. In addition, the UN faces operational challenges, which have failed to
eradicate the most pressing global issues including humanitarian needs in conflict
situations. Both these extremes are valid on several accounts and are flawed in others.
Nevertheless, it is important to examine the ways in which the UN’s benefits and
drawbacks affect the challenges that are faced by UN agencies in addition to the
political influence of states that affect the UN’s impact on the legal framework that
govern non-state armed groups.
A. Challenges of the United Nations System
There is a variety of scholarly work on the challenges of the UN system, each with a
different perspective on the reasons behind the challenges that face UN agencies. One
perspective on this issue is that UN agency operations have been ineffective in
dealing with crisis situations due to their inherent operational challenges, which can
be argued are independent of the scope of international law frameworks. 103 It is
believed that UN agencies are inefficient within themselves due to their management
system and their general strategies that constrain them from being able to attend to all
those in need, which is irrespective of the current legal framework governing nonstate armed groups. Like any organization, UN agencies are led by the expertise of
individuals, who are not free from committing errors in judgment such as prioritizing
certain global issues over others or deciding to approach an operational challenge in
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an incorrect manner. 104 There are also structural challenges that the UN faces
including overlapping mandates within several agencies causing a large number of
inefficiencies. 105 Furthermore, it cannot be neglected that in the both the higher and
lower level bodies of the UN there are concerns of wastefulness, inefficiencies,
corruption, inefficient management structures or promotion strategies, and in some
cases, sexual abuse of vulnerable populations. 106
On the executive level, the mere structure of the UNSC alone causes
stagnancy in the provisions of the governance of non-state armed groups, let alone the
authorization of intervention leading to the intensification of conflicts on the hands of
the UNSC. On several occasions, the UNSC has authorized interventions in conflict
situations that have resulted in the worsening of the conflict as opposed to restoring
peace and security. Furthermore, the General Assembly has proven to be less than
effective in situations where there is a deadlock between members of the UNSC.
Despite several of these disadvantages that the UN possesses, there are a number of
benefits that the UN has brought about the international system.
B. Benefits of the United Nations System
Considering the UN’s track record in attending to the needs of affected populations in
conflict situations, 107 it is evident that although the mentioned inefficiencies may
exist, the UN’s protocols for dealing with such situations have proven more effective
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than many other actors. UN agencies’ operational strategies take into account the
potential structural or institutional inefficiencies that may arise through the
implementation of contingency plans and risk registers. 108 Furthermore, UN agencies
have been of the most effective international organizations to address the needs of
populations with regards to health, nutrition, protection, and displacement. 109 The
argument of UN ineffectiveness is heavily based on executive inefficiencies from the
part of the UNSC or the General Assembly in effectively ending a conflict or holding
a particular party accountable for violations under IHL. These are mostly based on
political interests that govern the highest level of bodies in the UN. This is not
necessarily true for lower level bodies that simply aid populations in needs whilst
attempting to be as neutral and impartial as possible. 110 Although there have been
situations where humanitarian workers have caused irreparable damage to affected
populations, 111 this is yet to be proven as the norm in such a setting.
Furthermore, there is the argument that places the burden of UN agencies’
challenges completely on international law alone. It claims that international law is
responsible for crippling the ability for humanitarian agencies to execute their
operations in several ways including the issue of the governance of non-state armed
groups. 112 This view insists that the single reason for the challenges that UN agencies
face is the current legal framework that they operate in and that this framework is
insufficient in providing gateways for humanitarian agencies to support conflictaffected populations. However, this perspective is ultimately flawed in such that it
assumes that international law is applied perfectly as prescribed by the books. But
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international law does not operate in a vacuum and human errors are bound to occur.
This is why it is important to balance both the view of partial ineffectiveness of UN
agencies with the idea that international law limits the UN’s ability to access certain
regions governed by non-state armed groups.
In that light, international law has in many ways protected humanitarian
agencies on the ground through providing stipulations that ensure that states provide
the necessary access and protection for humanitarian personnel and their convoys in
situations of conflict, although there are several incidents where this has not been the
case. It also demands that parties to the conflict ensure that humanitarian
organizations are not targeted during armed conflict. The access challenges can also
be attributed to the violent conduct of non-state armed groups themselves. It is
therefore the responsibility of the agencies to ensure the cooperation of non-state
armed groups within the limits of international law. 113
The independent views on the effectiveness of both the UN and international
law, while valid on several accounts, are not sufficient alone. Through analyzing the
propositions, elements of each can be combined to provide an accurate perception of
the reality concerning the reasons behind UN agencies’ inability to pursue their access
strategies to the fullest. Inefficiencies are bound to happen; yet UN agencies in their
operational capacity have shown, strictly through their operations to distribute
humanitarian aid, considerable effort in attempting to alleviate these inefficiencies. At
the same time, international law has not provided the best of platforms for UN
agencies to operate within specifically when they are forced to interact with non-state
armed groups under laws that do not articulate a detailed method of how their
mandate can be fulfilled. UN agencies have somewhat relied on their own expertise
and negotiation skills to be granted access to restricted areas, all within the limits of
the law. However, the unpredictability and fluctuation of gaining access to restricted
regions, specifically those in the mentioned conflict areas, is what leads UN agencies
to facing these drawbacks. This unpredictability is a result of the lack of
comprehensive legal framework needed to consistently maintain a certain standard of
interaction between humanitarian organizations and non-state armed groups.
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VI.

LEGAL REFORM

There is an urgent need for legal reform in IHL. Presenting a system of reciprocity
between international law and non-state armed groups would greatly benefit UN
agencies in fulfilling their mandates. Legal reform would offer a plausible solution to
the lack of adherence to customary international law by non-state armed groups. This
necessitates that non-state armed groups are granted a mechanism to become
decision-makers within the legal system and in return will be held accountable for
violating the principles they have agreed to, inclusive of customary principles. Under
this view, it can be argued that if this mechanism is implemented, UN agencies will
be given more opportunities to create dialogue with non-state armed groups and will
be granted further access to NGCAs. Current customs have not yet taken this reality
into account and should therefore adapt to the changing nature of the international
system, which is the principle argument of this research. It is equally important to
implement operational reforms in the UN, which would run parallel with the legal
reforms. Creating an environment with a higher level of accountability for UN
agencies, alongside the reformation of the current legal and political structures that
govern non-state armed groups would ultimately alleviate the access challenges that
these agencies face. Such a process is a significantly difficult task and requires a
change in the way that politics and international law approach non-state armed
groups.
A. Changing the Approach
The proposition of reform is not only based on amending the laws and creating
new customs, which requires an elongated process of state practice and cooperation,
but rather it is also based on attempting to revolutionize the approach that states,
scholars, and lawyers take when addressing non-state armed groups in an armed
conflict. The immediate classification instilled on non-state armed groups who
demand independence or cessation is a reactionary one, which assumes that there is a
threat on the regime’s legitimacy, state sovereignty, or territorial integrity that must
be contained. This kind of approach should be reformed for many reasons including
that the result of this exclusion is that UN agencies face obstacles when dealing with
non-state armed groups. This is not to say that changing the way in which the
international community approaches the legal or political position of non-state armed
groups is an easy task. On the contrary, it is much more difficult than changing state
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or organizational policies or interpretations of law. Altering the provisions of IHL as a
whole and its general principles in order to create a balance of centricity between the
state and non-state armed groups is hardly among popular thought in state ideologies
or within international organizations. However, because international law should
ideally be the foundation of state actions and the actions of the international
community, it is imperative that this reform be considered at minimum. Policy
alterations, while effective in particular situations, are still only effective inasmuch as
the situation allows. Policies can be frequently changed and are somewhat arbitrary
according to the time and place they are being applied. They also greatly differ
between states and are therefore quite heterogeneous. The idea of altering the
approach to the way in which non-state armed groups are governed would create a
homogenous structure that should be adhered to by entire international community,
although this process would prove to be more difficult considering the potential need
for state consent. Furthermore, because of the frequency of policy alterations, they
hold less accountability than a change in law.
However, Thomas Franck would argue that the formal status of the law is the least
aspect that determines the behavior of individuals and institutions, 114 which is
understandable considering the immense violations of international law that both
individuals and institutions commit, as is seen by the examples of Yemen, Libya, and
Ukraine, among others. Yet, these violations are also a factor of the ways in which
law is constructed to benefit those who use it as a tool to further political and
economic gains. Therefore, the purpose of altering the legal framework that governs
non-state armed groups aims to diminish the ability for institutions to utilize, if not
manipulate, the principles of international law to further their benefits and in the
process create an unfairness in international law. However, as mentioned, legal
reform would be best complemented with policy and operational reform to enhance
the ability for UN agencies to approach non-state armed groups in an effort to
alleviate access constraints.
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B. Policy Reform
Policy suggestions may include alterations in the UN’s operational effectiveness
through streamlining policies within UN agencies so as to create a more efficient
approach to crisis situations. It can also be supported by a culture of transparency,
which has not been the case thus far within the UN considering the example of the
investigations made regarding humanitarian workers sexually assaulting vulnerable
populations in peacekeeping missions, among other examples. 115 In addition, the
culture of absolute impunity of their institutions and agencies, which the UN so
adamantly clings to, should be completely eliminated. It seems that UN institutions
are not held accountable for their errors and ineffectiveness as they should be.
Preaching a culture of fairness and justice whilst providing impunity to humanitarian
personnel and their respective institutions in an effort to lessen reputational hazards is
hypocritical to say the least. 116 This particular policy suggestion is difficult to
implement but not impossible if other institutions were to demand justice from the
UN using the limits of the law as their gateway for that justice. Finally, and what may
be a realistically implementable policy reform, UN organizations should consider
disempowering donor demands. This was briefly mentioned in the first chapter;
however, creating a framework where donors would be subjected to the mandate of
the organization, as opposed to state policies, would effectively expand the outreach
of UN organizations to affected populations. It would also grant these organizations
the freedom to implement their own needs assessments for these populations and act
accordingly.
From a legal perspective, and to further reinstate the importance of effectiveness
for UN agencies, it would be highly beneficial to ensure the adherence of the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibilities of
International Organizations. 117 This would be with the intent to ensure accountability
and transparency of international organizations as a whole. However, these provisions
only deal with legal responsibility of organizations and do not involve issues such as
115

Ndulo, supra note 106.
See e.g., Claude Bruderlein & Pierre Gassmann, Managing Security Risks in
Hazardous Missions: The Challenges of Securing United Nations Access to
Vulnerable Groups, 19 HARVARD HUM. R. J, 63 – 93, (2006).
117
International Law Commission, Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations, With Commentaries, 63rd Session, 2 YEARBOOK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 2, (2011).
116

57

governance, accountability, or criminal responsibility, such as in situations of sexual
offences. 118 Therefore, it would be beneficial to revisit the articles in order to
incorporate such concepts within legal framework. However, we are once again faced
with the issue of binding organizations to such provisions without their consent, hence
the reasoning behind suggesting policy reform as opposed to legal reform.
Nevertheless, this is a suggestion worth exploring, perhaps in later research.
Looking at reforming the conduct of non-state armed groups, the presented policy
suggestions would be paralleled with a process of legal reform. If implemented
correctly, this would ensure that humanitarian organizations are able to interact with
non-state armed groups under different conditions so as to ensure that their access
constraints on affected populations are alleviated. In an effort to close the gap
between international law and humanitarian organizations’ interaction with non-state
armed groups, some humanitarian agencies have recently taken it upon themselves to
attempt to develop agreements with non-state armed groups in order to tackle the
issue of access constraints, among other challenges that they face because of the
groups’ lack of adherence to international principles. They have created what are
known to be “Rules of Engagement” that are a form of code of conduct created to
invite non-state armed groups to adhere to international principles in exchange for
providing them with an international personality.
C. Rules of Engagement
The Rules of Engagement that the humanitarian community has attempted to
implement as a form of agreement with non-state armed groups are essentially the
principles enshrined in IHL and customary international law. These rules are
formulated to ensure the least amount of damage caused to civilians during conflict,
ensuring the protection of humanitarian organizations, aid, and convoys, and finally
attempting to ensure that there is an adherence to the principles of armed conflict. The
non-state armed groups are therefore required to uphold their agreements with
humanitarian organizations, and in return, these organizations facilitate national and
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international dialogues between states and non-state armed groups in order to give
them a form of recognition in the international system. 119
The effectiveness of these Rules, however, must be assessed in order to
determine whether such a strategy should be incorporated within the law. It can be
argued that the Rules have been far more effective than international law has been in
educating non-state armed groups on the principles of IHL and customary principles.
They have also been effective in incentivizing non-state armed groups to adhering to
these principles by adopting a method of inclusion in international and national
dialogues. Through these dialogues, non-state armed groups are able to voice their
concerns to the international community and their cooperation is then reciprocated. 120
Furthermore, the monitoring bodies that administer these Rules actively perform
investigations through their missions to assess the certain actors’ level of adherence to
international law principles. The ICRC and Human Rights Watch are of the
organizations that perform such missions and have attempted to improve non-state
armed groups’ adherence to international principles in the past, including in both
Libya and Yemen. 121
The drawback to the implementation of the Rules of Engagement is that they
are only effective inasmuch as states are willing to participate in the process of
dialogue and reciprocity with non-state armed groups. While these rules may be
effective in principle, they are highly subjective to the context in which they are
applied. Each state will react differently to the possibility of roundtable discussions
with a non-state armed group, specifically if that group threatens the effectiveness of
the ruling regime in order to gain their own sovereignty. 122 Agreeing to the process of
dialogue would mean that the state is recognizing the non-state armed group and is
entering into discussions with the group based on that recognition. Therefore, it is
argued that the Rules could be very effective or completely ineffective depending on
the state’s intentions towards the process. 123 It is also believed that these Rules have
not been effective because they are yet to change the reality on the ground. Some
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scholars have the perspective of these Rules being idealistic and that because most
states would not cooperate in such a process, the non-state armed groups would lose
incentive towards adhering to such principles. It is argued by one scholar that this is
precisely the reality; humanitarian organizations are continuously facing challenges
because the state-centric system is unwilling to integrate non-state armed groups
within the system, effectively losing all potential cooperation with the non-state
armed group. 124 Although Rules of Engagement may be effective in principle, nonstate armed groups remain in violation of their principles because of the lack of
reciprocity of state actors.
However, it can equally be argued that the Rules are convincing enough to have
non-state armed groups cooperate with humanitarian organizations in order to further
the benefits of both parties. 125 Although states may not be in full cooperation as of
yet, the involvement of humanitarian organizations to further their own interests in
terms of fulfilling their mandate is a method of ensuring that populations in need are
receiving their required assistance.
There is a potential for humanitarian organizations to be granted access to NGCAs
through such rules in the event that the state is willing to cooperate with them. This is
taken as a method of mitigating the access constraints faced by UN agencies, as it
seems to be the starting point for improving the legal system. The idea is to emulate
the structure of the Rules of Engagement, which should be incorporated within the
laws of IHL. Currently, IHL is restricted to a state-centric system that does not allow
humanitarian agencies to engage with non-state armed groups outside the limits of the
law. The incorporation of the Rules of Engagement within the IHL will allow for an
expansion of that doctrine, which will have a greater effect on the mandates of
humanitarian organizations by allowing them to extend their outreach to populations
of besieged areas. Furthermore, applying such a structure would create a process of
accountability whereby non-state armed groups would be bound by principles of IHL
in exchange for being recognized as non-state armed groups with a legal personality
that does not equate a state but should have similar rights in warfare. In addition, their
involvement in international and regional dialogues as political actors will be a form
of granting these rights, which may be stripped from them if violations were to occur.
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This should provide them with incentives to adhere to the Rules. However, under the
current state-centric structure of international law, once again, this is highly
dependent on the state’s willingness to involve non-state armed groups in such a
process considering the system will still maintain the importance of protecting state
sovereignty. If this is reached, states will have a platform of discussion with non-state
armed groups facilitated by UN agencies, which will allow for the betterment of
access strategies in times of conflict so as to improve outreach to affected
populations. A more effective method would be to alter the system as a whole to
remove the idea of state-centricity in order to allow international organizations to
bypass the state and legally recognize non-state armed groups in order to create a
more regional involvement for these actors. However, this task would be
exceptionally difficult, though not impossible in the long-run.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

International humanitarian law as a whole, whether it is in reference to international
or non-international armed conflicts, has been incapable of dealing with the idea that
non-state armed groups are an entity worth recognizing as a part of the international
system. 126 Instead, the focus of international law is on attempting to bind non-state
armed groups to current international law principles, which has not been a successful
strategy thus far. 127 This is especially true after the events of the Arab Spring of 2011
occurred, when an influx of non-state armed groups appeared in the Middle Eastern
region and international law was unsuccessful in implementing a framework that
deals with non-state armed groups as a legal entity. 128 Under international law, the
creation of non-state armed groups is not prohibited. Prohibitions against the creation
of non-state armed groups fall under domestic law of certain states. Yet, international
law seems to criminalize non-state armed groups without prohibiting them but have
not yet implemented a constructive method of interacting with them. Therefore,
relying on the current system of governance of non-state armed groups causes there to
be a gap between the law and its implementation.
Not only does this gap pose theoretical dilemmas in the legal sphere, but it
also leads to obstacles faced by UN agencies in attempting to execute their operations.
As mentioned, considering the events of the Arab Spring and their effects post-2011,
UN agencies were necessary in providing assistance in areas where conflicts arose.
The Middle Eastern countries used as examples to depict the challenges faced by UN
agencies as a result of the insufficiencies of the current legal framework governing
non-state armed groups were Yemen and Libya subsequent to the 2011 Arab Spring,
as both consist of the presence of several non-state armed groups as parties within the
same conflict ultimately subjecting UN agencies to several access challenges. This is
also true in Eastern Europe where the Ukrainian civil conflict has presented
complications for UN agencies to effectively implement their mandate. This again is
due to the inefficiencies of the existing legal framework of IHL that governs non-state
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armed groups’ conduct during conflict. Such inefficiencies are also a result of the
fluctuating political dynamics of the system, whereby the UN’s ineffectiveness and
state interests have played a major role in determining the political and legal position
of non-state armed groups. This furthers the difficulty in treating non-state armed
groups as an entity worth interacting with during conflict situations.
The situation in all three conflicts is as follows: non-state armed groups are
emerging and are becoming of great significance in the international system. Some
non-state armed groups are seeking independence whilst others are considered
terrorist organizations, although some may overlap. International law does not
currently have a mechanism to qualify conflicts with the complexity of those such as
Yemen, Libya, or Ukraine whereby the non-state armed group is strong enough to
demand secession and the state is unable to contain it. International law is also lacking
a mechanism for binding these non-state armed groups to the principles outlined in
the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols or customary law. This includes ensuring
the safety of civilians and authorizing assistance from humanitarian organizations. An
incentive for non-state armed groups to adhere to international law principles would
be to allow for their independence, grant them recognition, or incorporate them in a
political decision-making process. But, the current international legal system does not
recognize non-state armed groups as more than belligerents under the legal
framework of an IAC. 129 This perspective is important in explaining where the
challenge lies for UN agencies to execute their operations.
The intent here was not to provide a new comprehensive framework for nonstate armed groups. On the contrary, through the research, a conclusion is made that
there is simply a need to develop the current framework without having to formulate a
new methodology of dealing with non-state armed groups. There is no need to
completely recreate the legal framework for non-state armed groups but simply to
improve its provisions on governing the interaction between humanitarian agencies
and non-state armed groups. However, it must be understood that there is a need to
reassess the way the current framework of non-state armed groups is approached. It
must be recognized that non-state armed groups are no longer an exception to the
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norm of international law. Their numbers and significance are becoming an integral
part of the international system and should therefore become systemized within
international law. 130 This was also illustrated through analyzing the drawbacks of the
absence of a comprehensive framework that have led to impediments on UN
operations in the three conflicts. Therefore, there is a need to introduce policy and
operational reform to the UN structure as well as state policies in order to lessen the
impact that such dynamics have on the international legal system. More specifically,
incorporating the Rules of Engagement doctrine, as an example, into the provisions of
IHL would serve the creation of an explicit relationship between non-state armed
groups and humanitarian organizations. It would bind non-state armed groups to a set
of principles in exchange for being involved in international and regional dialogues.
This could provide incentive for the non-state armed group to adhere to such
principles and creates an implicit accountability mechanism that is currently
nonexistent. If this is applied, UN agencies would be granted access to NGCAs with
the consent of both the state and non-state actors, a process of accountability would be
in place to ensure non-state armed groups’ adherence to IHL principles, and finally,
affected populations would be able to receive the aid they deserve in both a
theoretical and practical sense under IHL and human rights law.
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